The Roberts Court: Year 1 by Ringhand, Lori A
1The Roberts Court: Year 1 
 
Prof. Lori A. Ringhand* 
 
The 2005 term of the U.S. Supreme Court is of extraordinary interest to court observers. For the 
first time in 11 years, the Court’s term commenced without Chief Justice Rehnquist and ended without 
Associate Justice O’Connor. The departure of these two justices marked the end of one of the longest 
natural court periods (a period when there are no personnel changes on the court) in history. The 
departure of Justice O’Connor, long the ideological center of the Court, also marked a potential shift in 
the direction of the Court’s jurisprudence.  
 
Given this, it is hardly surprising that legal scholars have been actively assessing the just-ended 
term. This paper contributes to that scholarship by examining the Court’s seminal 2005 term “by the 
numbers”: by empirically analyzing what the Court actually did, rather than substantively evaluating 
what it should have or could have done. In doing so, I look at the number of decisions issued by the 
Court, the issues which those decisions involved, the ideological direction of the decisions, and the vote 
margins by which those decisions were issued. I also look specifically at the voting records of the new 
justices, Chief Justice Roberts and Associate Justice Alito, examining the ideological direction of their 
votes, the issue areas in which they were most active, the number of concurring and dissenting opinions 
they each wrote, and the justices with which they most frequently aligned themselves.  
 
This analysis yields several surprises. First, despite the addition of two new and presumably 
conservative justices, the ideological direction of the Court’s decisions did not change dramatically.  
Second, the Court was -  at least for this one term - more unified than it had been in the recent past, 
issuing a higher percentage of unanimous decisions and a lower percentage of 5 to 4 decisions than it 
2did in 2004.  Finally, while Justices Roberts and Alito both, as generally expected, aligned themselves 
most frequently with the Court’s conservative justices, a careful examination of their voting records 
shows that these justices actually were aligned more closely with each other than with the Court’s 
established conservatives. Justice Roberts also showed a surprisingly high rate of agreement with some 
of the Court’s more liberal justices, although this was not the case in the term’s most controversial 
decisions.   
 
Explanation of the Data 
 
This paper relies on the datasets and coding methodology developed by Harold Spaeth for use 
in the Supreme Court Databases.1 The Spaeth databases include information about all U.S. Supreme 
Court decisions issued from 1953 to 2004. When making comparisons between the 2005 term and 
earlier terms, data about the earlier terms was culled from either the Spaeth Original Supreme Court 
database or the Spaeth Justice-Centered database, as updated and amended for my earlier work.2 I coded 
the Court’s 2005 term myself, following Spaeth’s coding methodology.3 My analysis throughout this 
paper includes only those cases in which the Court heard oral argument and issued a formal, full 
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1 The Spaeth databases are available at http://www.as.uky.edu/polisci/ulmerproject/. The creation of the Spaeth databases was 
supported by the National Science Foundation.  
2 The Spaeth justice-centered dataset was revised and updated by me for use in Judicial Activism on the Rehnquist Natural 
Court, forthcoming Spring 2007 in CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY. The Spaeth Original Supreme Court database was 
updated and revised for me for use in The Rehnquist Court: A ‘By the Numbers” Retrospective, forthcoming Spring 2007 in the 
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. The revised justice-centered dataset is available at 
http://www.uky.edu/Law/faculty/ringhand.html (as “Judicial Activism Dataset”). The revised Supreme Court dataset also is 
available at that location (as “Rehnquist Retrospective Dataset”).  
3 The dataset I created to analyze the 2005 term is available at http://www.uky.edu/Law/faculty/ringhand.html (under “current 
research”, “2005 Data”). 
3opinion. This includes per curium decisions and plurality decisions, but does not include memorandum 
opinions and decrees.4
I. The 2005 Term: Decisions of the Court 
 
A. The cases: issue areas, ideological direction, and majority opinion writers 
 
In the 2005 term, the Roberts Court heard oral argument and issued full, formal opinions in 69 
cases.5 The issues raised in these cases were quite similar to those addressed by the Court in its 2004 
term. As shown below, the 2005 Roberts Court and the 2004 Rehnquist Court both issued most of their 
decisions in two issue areas, criminal procedure and economic activity. Each court also issued a 
significant percentage of its decisions in the civil rights and judicial power areas:6
4 I also made certain substantive changes to the Spaeth databases. I did this when my examination of the underlying cases 
indicated that a coding error had occurred or that the coding protocols used by Spaeth were plainly substantively inappropriate 
for this project. The only systemic substantive change made to the Spaeth databases involved a coding choice made by Spaeth 
that resulted in some cases arising under the Eleventh Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment being coded as raising 
questions of state-level judicial review, even though the Court in these cases actually considered the constitutionality of a 
federal statute.  I changed this coding to reflect that the legally relevant decision in these cases involved the constitutionality of 
the federal, not the state, statute. A full explanation of the issue area groupings can be found in the Original U.S. Supreme 
Couirt Judicial Database Codebook at 45-56 http://www.as.uky.edu/polisci/ulmerproject/allcourt_codebook.pdf (hereinafter, 
Spaeth Codebook). A full list of the coding changes made to the publicly available Spaeth databases is available at 
http://www.uky.edu/Law/faculty/ringhand.html (under current research, “Changes to Spaeth Datasets: Explanatory 
Document”). 
5 A list of these cases, with citations, vote margins, issue areas, ideological direction, and each justice’s vote is listed in the 
Appendix. I did not code for all of Spaeth’s variables, opting instead to code only for the variables used herein. 
6 A full explanation of the issue area groupings can be found in the Spaeth Codeook at 45-56.  Each case is coded as involving 
only one issue. Following Spaeth, I have coded issue areas from a public policy, rather than a formally legal, standpoint. See 
Spaeth Codebook at 45.  The “Criminal Procedure”, “Civil Rights”, “First Amendment”, and “Federal Taxation” issue areas 
are self –explanatory. “Due Process” cases include only non-criminal cases raising due process issues; “Economic Activity” 
cases include cases raising commercial and business issues, including tort actions and non-civil rights based 
employer/employee disputes.  “Privacy” cases include abortion and sexual orientation cases; I also included the 2005 “right to 
die” case in this category. “Attorneys” cases include only those cases addressing the unique role of attorneys within the legal 
system, including fee cases.  “Judicial Power” cases include questions of federal court jurisdiction or authority; “Federalism” 
cases include cases arising under s.5 of the 14th Amendment, 11th Amendment cases, and Commerce Clause cases.  
42004 Term 2005 Term 
Criminal Procedure 27.0 %  29.4 % 
Economic Activity 18.9 23.5 
Civil Rights 16.2 13.2 
Judicial Power 14.9 13.2 
1st Amendment 8.1 8.8 
Due Process 8.1 2.9 
Federalism 4.1 2.9 
Miscellaneous  2.7 2.9 
Privacy 0.0 1.5 
Attorneys 0.0 1.5 
The ideological direction of the decisions issued in the two terms did vary, however. Of the 69 
decisions issued by the Roberts Court in the 2005 term, 56.5 percent (39 cases) generated a conservative 
outcome, and 39 percent (27 cases) generated a liberal outcome.7 Four percent (three cases) were 
ideologically uncodable.8 This record is notably different than that of the Court’s 2004 term. In that 
year, the Court heard oral argument and issued formal opinions in 74 cases, of which only 46 percent 
 
7 Spaeth codes decisions and opinions as ideologically “conservative” or “liberal” based on a complex coding scheme 
dependent in part on the issue raised in the case. A full explanation of Spaeth’s Coding protocols (followed by me here) is 
available in the Spaeth Original United States Supreme Court Database Codebook at 57-60 (hereinafter, Spaeth Codebook). 
The Spaeth Codebooks is available at http://www.as.uky.edu/polisci/ulmerproject/. The ideological coding generally follows 
expected, current political preferences: decisions in favor of an individual asserting a constitutional right are code as liberal 
(excepting “reverse race discrimination” cases, in which a decision in favor of the claimant is coded as conservative), as are 
decisions in favor of the exercise of federal government or judicial power, and in favor of unions, injured plaintiffs and debtors. 
Decisions favoring state’s rights, compelled arbitration, and property owners (in Takings Clause cases) are coded as 
conservative.   
8 Cases that do not fit any of Spaeth’s ideological codes are considered uncodable, as are cases with such fractured opinions 
that no single ideological direction can fairly be assigned to the opinion. The cases deemed ideologically uncodable here are 
eBay v. MercExchange, 126 S.Ct. 1837 (a unanimous decision involving a business practices patent); Wachovia v. Schmidt,
126 S.Ct. 941 (an 8 to 0 decision involving the location of a bank for purposes of diversity jurisdiction); and League of United 
Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 2006 WL 1749637 (a deeply fractured opinion involving a Texas redistricting effort that 
rejected a “political gerrymandering” claim while upholding a Voting Rights Act claim that one of the newly created districts 
depleted the voting rights of Hispanic citizens).  
5(34 cases) generated conservative outcomes, almost 53 percent (39 cases) generated liberal outcomes, 
and one was uncodable. 
 
The Roberts Court thus appears to have generated notably more conservative opinions than did 
its predecessor. This is, however, somewhat misleading. While the Court in its 2005 term did issue a 
higher percentage of conservative cases than it did in its 2004 term, it actually was the 2004 term that 
was the ideological anomaly. Since the Rehnquist Court attained its final composition in 1994 (when 
Justice Breyer replaced Justice Blackmun), the Court has issued more conservative than liberal opinions 
in each term except the 2000 and 2004 terms. The Court’s 2004 term was, in fact, by far the Court’s 
most liberal term in recent history:    
 
Term Conservative Liberal 
1994 54 % 46 % 
1995 51 49 
1996 59 41 
1997 59 41 
1998 59 41 
1999 51 49 
2000 49 51 
2001 59 41 
2002 55 45 
2003 52 48 
2004 36 53 
2005 56.5 39 
As shown above, between the 1994 and 2004 terms, 53 percent of the decisions issued by the 
Supreme Court have been ideologically conservative. The Roberts Court’s 2005 term record of 56.5 
6percent conservative opinions is thus only slightly above the Rehnquist Court’s performance in recent 
years.9
Given that a majority of the decisions issued in the 2005 term were ideologically conservative, 
it is perhaps not surprising that Justices Scalia and Kennedy authored the most majority opinions that 
term, followed by Justice Thomas and Chief Justice Roberts himself. The number of majority opinions 
written by each justice, organized by the issue areas the opinions involved, is as follows: 
 
9 The decisions of the modern Supreme Court have been fairly evenly ideologically divided: since 1953 (when Spaeth’s dataset 
begins) 48 percent of the Supreme Court’s formally issued opinions (excluding decrees and memorandum opinions) have been 
ideologically conservative and 52 percent have been ideologically liberal. Note, however, that Spaeth’s ideological coding is 
purely relative, meaning that an outcome is “liberal” or “conservative” only relative to the other possible outcome in the case. 
In other words, these terms are not keyed to any substantive political position or ideology and are thus subject to movement 













Fed Misc Total 
Per Cur 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Stevens 1 1 0 0 0 0 4 0 1 0 7
O’C 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 3
Scalia 5 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 9
Kennedy 3 1 2 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 9
Souter 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 2 0 0 7
Thomas 3 1 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 0 8
Ginsb. 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 4 0 1 7
Breyer 2 1 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 6
Roberts 2 0 2 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 8
Alito 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 4
Total 20 
 
9 6 2 1 1 17 8 3 2 69
7Also not surprising, given his new position as the presumptive ideological center of the Roberts 
Court, is the fact that the opinions authored by Justice Kennedy generated an identical number of liberal 










Per Curiam 0 1 0 1
Stevens 1 6 0 7
Scalia 7 2 0 9
Kennedy 4 4 1 9
Souter 5 2 0 7
Thomas 6 1 1 8
Ginsburg 2 4 1 7
Breyer 3 3 0 6
Roberts  6 2 0 8
Alito 2 2 0 4
O’Connor 3 0 0 3
Total 39 27 3 69 
b. Judicial unity: vote margins and separate opinions  
 
At his confirmation hearings, Chief Justice Roberts frequently expressed a desire to bring 
greater unity to the Supreme Court.11 Consistent with this goal, the Supreme Court during his first term 
 
10 The ideologically conservative opinions authored by Justice Kennedy were Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply, 126 S.Ct. 1991 
(2006); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (2006)(holding that the First Amendment does not protect statements made by 
government employees in the course of their employment); Rice v. Collins, 126 S.Ct. 969 (2006)(upholding as race neutral a 
prosecutor’s preemptory strike of an African-American juror); Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S.Ct. 2479 (2006)(striking down as a 
violation of the First Amendment campaign regulations enacted by the State of Vermont).   The ideologically liberal opinions 
he authored were Hill v. McDonough, 126 S.Ct. 2096 (2006)(allowing a challenge to the method of execution used in death 
penalty cases); Dolan v. USPS, 126 S.Ct. 1252 (2006)(holding that a tort claim against the U.S. Postal Office was not barred by 
the Federal Torts Claims Act); Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S.Ct. 904 (2006)(holding that the federal Attorney General did not 
have statutory authority to block assisted suicides); and House v. Bell, 126 S.Ct. 2064 (2006)(allowing a convicted criminal to 
request a new hearing in light of new evidence).  The uncoded opinion was the Texas redistricting case, League of United Latin 
American Citizens v. Perry, 126 S.Ct. 2594 (2006).  
11 See for example Chief Justice Robert’s testimony at his confirmation hearing:, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/09/14/AR2005091402308.html.
8has been slightly more unified than it was during Chief Justice Rehnquist’s last term. The Roberts Court 
in the 2005 term issued a lower percentage of 5 to 4 decisions, and a higher percentage of unanimous 
decisions, than did the Rehnquist Court in its 2004 term: 
 
2004 2005 
5-3 5.4% 2.9% 
5-4 21.6 15.9 
6-2 2.7 4.3 
6-3 12.2 11.6 
7-1 0.0 2.9 
7-2 14.6 8.7 
8-0 6.8 17.4 
8-1 6.8 2.9 
9-0 29.7 33.3 
While the political dynamics on the Supreme Court may be different than they were when Chief 
Justice Rehnquist first assumed leadership of the Court in 1986, Chief Justice Roberts also achieved 
notably greater unity in his first term than did Chief Justice Rehnquist in his:12 
12 There is, however, at least one interesting similarity between the 1986 and the 2005 terms. In each of those terms, seven of 
the nine justices sitting were appointed by Republican presidents. In 1986, Justices Rehnquist (appointed by Nixon; elevated by 
Reagan), Scalia (Reagan),  Blackmun (Nixon), Brennan (Eisenhower), O’Connor (Reagan), Powell (Nixon) and Stevens (Ford) 
were appointed by Republican presidents, while only Justices White (Kennedy) and Marshall (Johnson) were appointed by 
Democrats. In 2005, Chief Justice Roberts (G.W. Bush),  Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy (Reagan), Thomas (G.H.W. Bush) and 
Alito (G.W. Bush) were appointed by Republican presidents, while only Justices Ginsburg (Clinton) and Breyer (Clinton) were 
appointed by Democrats. See U.S. Supreme Court webpage, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/members.pdf.
91986 2005 
5-2 0.7 % 0
5-3 1.4 2.9% 
5-4 28.4 15.9 
6-2 2.8 4.3 
6-3 22.1 11.6 
7-0 1.4 0
7-1 0 2.9 
7-2 11 8.7 
8-0 2.8 17.4 
8-1 4.8 2.9 
9-0 24.8 33.3 
As shown above, 55 percent of the Court’s 1986 opinions were issued by vote margins of 6 to 3 
or closer, while only 35 percent of the 2005 opinions were. Moreover, it appears that Chief Justice 
Roberts, as promised in his confirmation hearings, has actively promoted this unity by voting with the 
majority more often than any other justice. As shown below, in the 2005 term Chief Justice Roberts 
voted with the majority in 57 of the 68 cases he took part in. Justice Scalia, in contrast, wrote or joined 
the most concurring opinions, while Justices Stevens and Breyer were the term’s most frequent 
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dissenters. Of the justices that served the full term, Justice Stevens joined the fewest majority 
opinions:13
Wrote or joined 
Dissent 
Wrote or joined 
Majority 
Wrote or joined 
Concurrence 
Stevens 15 45 8 
Scalia 6 51 11
Kennedy 6 54 8
Souter 12 53 3 
Thomas 12 49 6 
Ginsburg 13 49 6 
Breyer 14 48 6 
Roberts 4 58 4
Alito 3 27 3
O’Connor 0 18 0
As shown above, Justice Roberts also wrote or joined the fewest separate opinions of any of the 
justices sitting during the full 2005 term (Justice Alito did not join the Court until January 31, 2006 and 
thus did not serve the entire 2005 term).14 Roberts signed concurring opinions in only 4 cases, and 
dissented in only 4 more. This gives him a dissent rate of only 6 percent, the lowest rate of any of the 
justices. This also is significantly lower than Justice Rehnquist’s dissent rate in his first term as Chief 
Justice: in 1986, Justice Rehnquist dissented over 23 percent of time. In fact, among the justices sitting 
in the 2005 term, Justice Rehnquist’s 1986 record is closest to Justice Stevens’, who had a 2005 term 
dissent rate of 22 percent.    
 
13 These categories are mutually exclusive, meaning that a justice joining or writing a concurring opinion is not also counted as 
voting with the majority in that case. 
14 See U.S. Supreme Court webpage,  http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/members.pdf.
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Despite this (relatively) high level of agreement among the justices, there were distinct, clearly 
identifiable areas of disagreement. A closer examination of the issue areas and ideological direction of 
the 2005 cases, listed by the vote margin the cases were decided by, illustrates this: 
 
Vote in the Case 
5-3 5-4 6-2 6-3 7-1 7-2 8-0 8-1 9-0 
Total 
Crim Pro 3 0 2 0 2 2 1 3 13 
Civil Rights 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 5
1st Am 1 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 5
Due Process 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Attorneys 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Econ Activity 1 0 0 1 2 1 0 2 7
Judicial Pw 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 3 6
Misc 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Conservative 
Total 6 3 6 1 6 5 2 10 39 
Vote in the Case Total 
5-3 5-4 6-2 6-3 7-1 7-2 8-0 8-1 9-0 
Crim Pro 0 2 1 0 1 3 7
Civil Rights 1 0 0 0 1 1 3
1st Am 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Due Process 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Privacy 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
Econ Activity 0 0 0 1 3 4 8
Judicial Pw 0 1 0 0 0 2 3
Federalism 0 1 0 0 0 2 3
Liberal 
Total 2 4 2 1 6 12 27 
As shown above, the justices disagreed most frequently in criminal procedure cases. Criminal 
procedure cases generating conservative outcomes were the most controversial, with five of these cases 
decided by either a 5 to 4 or a 6 to 3 vote margin. Criminal procedure cases yielding liberal results 
contributed an additional three narrowly decided cases. Conservative First Amendment cases also were 
quite contentious, with four of those cases decided by a 6 to 3 vote margin or closer. Almost certainly 
not coincidentally, these two issue areas – criminal procedure (particularly habeas corpus cases) and 
12
First Amendment (particularly election law regulation) – were two of the issue areas in which Justice 
O’Connor often cast a decisive vote.15 
Economic Activity cases, in contrast, were the least contested, with all nine cases in that issue 
area decided by a 7 to 1 or higher vote margin.  The Court’s federalism cases – an area that has 
generated numerous 5 to 4 decisions in recent years - also were surprisingly uncontroversial in the 2005 
term. Of the three federalism cases decided by the Court, two were unanimously decided in favor of the 
federal government. A third, also favoring the federal government, was decided by a 5 to 4 vote.16 
This relative unity, however, should not obscure a key point: buried within the list of 5 to 4 and 
6 to 3 decisions are almost all of the most important decisions of the 2005 term. These decisions, 
including Rumsfeld v. Hamdan17 (limiting the President’s ability to unilaterally lower procedural 
protections available to individuals detained in the “war on terror”); League of United Latin American 
Citizens v. Perry18 (upholding in part and striking down in part the mid-decade Texas redistricting 
orchestrated by former House Majority Leader Tom Delay); Rapanos v. U.S19 (involving the ability of 
the federal Environmental Protection Agency to regulate certain wetlands); and Gonzales v. Oregon20 
holding that the federal Justice Department did not have statutory authority to block physician-assisted 
 
15 See Lori A. Ringhand, The Rehnquist Court: A “By the Numbers” Retrospective, forthcoming in the UNIVERSITY OF 
PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, Spring 2007. 
16 The two unanimous cases were Northern Ins. V. Chatham Co., 126 S.Ct. 1689 (holding that a political subdivision that is not 
an “arm of the State” cannot claim 11th Amendment Immunity); and U.S. v. Georgia, 126 S.Ct. 877 (holding that Congress has 
power under section 5 of the 14th Amendment to abrogate state sovereign immunity as to conduct that actually violates the 14th 
Amendment). The case decided by a 5 to 4 margin was Central Virginia Community College v. Katz, 126 S.Ct. 990 (holding 
over the dissents of Justices Thomas, Roberts, Scalia and Kennedy that a bankruptcy trustees’ proceeding to set aside the 
debtors’ preferential transfers to state agencies was not barred by state sovereign immunity). Justice Alito had not yet replaced 
Justice O’Connor when Katz was decided; Justice O’Connor voted with the majority. 
17 126 S.Ct. 2749 (2006). 
18 126 S.Ct. 2594 (2006). 
19 126 S.Ct. 2208 (2006). 
20 126 S.Ct. 904 (2006). 
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suicides). It is thus clear that, despite Chief Justice Roberts’ success in achieving a higher overall 
degree of unity than seen in the 2004 terms, he has been unable and perhaps unwilling to bring greater 
unity to the Court in precisely the high-profile cases where unity arguably would be the most beneficial.  
 
II. Justices Roberts and Alito 
 
A. Ideological direction 
 
The 2005 term is, of course, interesting not just for the decisions made by the Court as a whole, 
but because it provides the first opportunity to evaluate the jurisprudence of Justices Roberts and Alito.  
Since Justice Alito did not join the Court until January, 2006, there were only 33 decisions issued in the 
2005 term in which all of the currently sitting justices participated. Within this body of cases, both 
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito voted for almost twice as many conservative as liberal outcomes:  
 
Conservative Liberal Uncoded 
Stevens 10 21 2 
Scalia 22 9 2 
Kennedy 19 12 2 
Souter 10 21 2 
Thomas 21 10 2 
Ginsburg 13 18 2 
Breyer 11 20 2 
Roberts 20 11 2
Alito 19 12 2
As shown above, both Roberts and Alito cast conservative-leaning votes in roughly 60 percent 
of these cases (60.6 percent and 57.5 percent, respectively). Notably, however, while both new justices 
cast more conservative votes than the more liberal members of the Court (Justices Stevens and Breyer 
cast only 10 conservative votes each), they did not cast as many conservative votes as Justices Thomas 
14
and Scalia: Justice Scalia cast the most conservative votes (22 votes, or 66.6 percent), followed by 
Justice Thomas (21 votes, or 63.6 percent). Justice Alito, in fact, cast exactly the same number of liberal 
and conservative votes as did centrist Justice Kennedy.21 
The issue areas in which Justices Roberts and Alito cast these votes are as follows:  
 
Ideological Votes by Issue Area – Justice Roberts (Alito) 
Conservative Liberal Uncoded Total 
Crim. Pro. 8 (8) 5 (5) 0 13 
Civil Rights 2 (2) 1 (1) 1 4 
1st Am. 2 (2)  0 (0) 0 2 
Due Proc. 1 (1) 0 (0) 0 1 
Econ. Act. 3 (3) 2 (2) 1 6 
Judicial Power 4 (3) 2 (3) 0 6 
Federalism 0 (0) 1 (1) 0 1 
Total 20 (19) 11 (12) 2 33 
As shown above, both of the new justices cast a plurality of their conservative votes in criminal 
procedure cases, although, because of the quantity of cases heard in this area, it also is the largest single 
issue area in which both of the justices cast liberal votes. The sole case in which the two justices 
disagreed with each other about the proper outcome was Empire Healthchoice v. McVeigh,22 a judicial 
power case in which a majority comprised of Justices Ginsburg, Roberts, Stevens, Scalia and Thomas 
held that no federal question was presented in a case involving a complex health insurance claim. 
Justice Alito joined Justices Breyer, Kennedy and Souter in voting in favor of the exercise of federal 
jurisdiction. 
 
21 These votes were, however, not always cast in the same cases. See Appendix.  
22 126 S.Ct. 2121 (2006). 
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B. Judicial alignment  rates 
 
Despite the high rate of agreement between Justices Roberts and Alito, there were subtle 
differences between them, and (less subtly) between them and the other members of the Court. These 
differences can be captured by looking beyond majority/minority voting blocs and examining the rates 
at which the justices joined each other’s concurring and dissenting opinions.  
 
Again examining only the cases in which all of the currently sitting nine justices participated, 
the alignment rates of the justices is below. In calculating alignment rates, I opted against dividing the 
justices into simple majority and dissenting blocs, choosing instead to construct my analysis in a way 
that captures the deeper levels of agreement expressed by a justice’s decision to write or join concurring 
and dissenting opinions. Under my methodology, each justice is counted as aligned with only one 
opinion per case, but that opinion can be a majority, concurrence, or dissent. For example, if Justices 
Roberts, Kennedy, Alito, Scalia and Thomas each join a majority opinion written by Justice Roberts, 
but Justice Scalia also writes a concurring opinion joined only by Justice Thomas, then Justices Scalia 
and Thomas will be counted as aligned with each other, but neither will be counted as aligned with 
Justice Roberts.23 (If a justice authors an opinion him or herself, he or she always is aligned with that 
opinion.)24 
23 In cases in which a justice joined more than one non-majority opinion, I made a subjective assessment about which 
secondary opinion was substantively more significant and aligned the justice with that opinion. The only case of the 33 coded 
for this analysis which presented a serious problem was Day v. McDonough, in which Justice Breyer joined the dissents of both 
Justice Stevens and Justice Scalia. Because Justice Stevens’ dissent did not address the merits of the majority’s decision (it 
disagreed with the decision to enter judgment in the case while a related case remained pending), I aligned Justice Breyer’s 
vote in this case with Justice Scalia’s more substantive dissent. 
24 This actually made some of the most fractured decisions the easiest to code. For example, in the Texas political 
gerrymandering case (League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry) six justices authored opinions, leaving only Justices 
Thomas, Alito and Ginsburg to be aligned elsewhere. I ultimately opted to group the justices in that case as follows: 1) 
Kennedy; 2) Stevens; 3) Souter and Ginsburg; 4) Breyer; 5) Roberts and Alito; and 6) Scalia and Thomas.   
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Unlike tabulating agreement rates by simply dividing justices into majority and dissenting 
blocs, this methodology tracks the nuanced differences of opinion between the justices as evidenced in 
their concurring and dissenting opinions.25 It is thus a far more subtle way of measuring the justices’ 
preferences. It also, however, means that lack of alignment between justices in any particular case (for 
example, the lack of alignment between Justices Roberts and Scalia in the example given above) is not 
necessarily evidence of actual disagreement – it means only that there was an opinion written in the 
case which a given justice agreed with more than the opinions with which he or she is not aligned.  
 
Using this methodology, the rates of alignment between the justices in the 2005 cases 












Stevens 33 % 42 % 61 % 36 % 54.5 % 61 % 45.5 % 36 % 
Scalia -- 51.5 45.5 76 42 45.5 70 64 
Kennedy  -- 54.5 61 48.5 48.5 70 70 
Souter  -- 45.5 70 76 58 58 
Thomas  -- 42 45.5 79 73 
Ginsburg -- 51.5 58 45.5 
Breyer  -- 57.5 48.5 
Roberts  -- 85 
That Justices Scalia and Stevens were aligned the least often is hardly surprising. Much more 
interesting is the extraordinarily high level of alignment between Justices Roberts and Alito. As noted 
above, there is only one case (Empire Healthchoice v. McVeigh) in which these two justices voted for 
 
25 Because these more nuanced levels of agreement can be culled even from unanimous cases (if, for example, a justice writes a 
concurring opinion), unanimous cases were not excluded from my analysis as they are often are from similar works.  
26 Unless a percentage falls precisely between two numbers, percentages are rounded to the nearest whole number. 
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different outcomes. There were only five additional cases, however, in which Justices Roberts and Alito 
were not perfectly aligned.27 
There are several possible explanations for this: two justices nominated in quick succession by 
the same President and confirmed by the same Senate may reasonably be assumed to have very similar 
judicial ideologies; two new justices joining a well-established group of justices may find a natural 
affiliation with each other regardless of their ideological preferences; or both justices as new justices 
may have chosen to exercise a similarly cautious approach during their first months on the Court. This 
extremely high alignment rate may, however, indicate that Justice Roberts and Justice Alito have a 
unique and common jurisprudential approach, one that is distinct from that of the Court’s more 
established conservative justices. This possibility certainly warrants attentive scrutiny in the coming 
years. 
 
Also interesting is the surprisingly high rate of alignment Justice Roberts shares with Justices 
Ginsburg and Souter. Justice Roberts aligned himself with these two justices 58 percent of the time. He 
aligned himself with Justice Breyer almost as often – 57.5 percent of the time. This makes Justice 
Roberts’ alignment rate with Clinton-appointees Ginsburg and Breyer higher than the alignment rate 
between those two justices themselves: Justices Ginsburg and Breyer aligned with each other in only 
51.5 percent of the cases examined here. While it obviously is too soon to make informed predictions on 
 
27 These cases are eBay v. MercExchanges, 126 S.Ct. 1837 (2006)(an ideologically uncoded economic activity case involving a 
patent dispute, in which Justice Roberts concurs with the majority opinion Justice Alito joins);    Burlington No. v. White, 126 
S.Ct. 2405 (2006) (a liberal civil rights case involving employment discrimination in which Justice Alito concurs with the 
majority opinion Justice Roberts joins); Dixon v. US, 125 S.Ct. 2437 (2006)(a conservative criminal procedure case in which 
Justice Alito concurs with the majority opinion Justice Roberts joins); Rapanos v. U.S, 126 S.Ct. 2208 (2006)(a conservative 
economic activity case involving regulation of certain wetlands by the federal Environmental Protection Agency in which 
Justice Roberts concurs with the majority opinion Justice Alito joins); and Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S.Ct. 2479 (2006)(a 
conservative First Amendment case striking down Vermont’s campaign finance regulations in which Justice Alito concurs with 
a majority opinion which Justice Roberts joins).  
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this point, these alignment rates raise the intriguing possibility that Justice Roberts may be willing to 
cross ideological lines – at least in low profile cases - and work with the Court’s more liberal justices to 
create a “minimalist majority” that counters the much more “maximalist” jurisprudence of Justices 




This “by the numbers” examination of the 2005 term reveals several interesting things. First, 
while the Roberts Court issued many more conservative opinions than did the Rehnquist Court in the 
2004 term, it was the 2004 term, not the 2005 term, that was inconsistent with the Court’s recent 
ideological record. Thus, it appears that the addition of (presumably) conservative Justices Roberts and 
Alito has not – or not yet – dramatically altered the ideological direction of the Court. This may provide 
some reassurance to those who feared that Justice Roberts and Alito would move the Court sharply 
rightward. Second, it appears that Chief Justice Roberts has, at least partially, accomplished his stated 
goal of bringing more unity to the Court. The Roberts Court issued fewer closely divided decisions in 
the 2005 term than the Rehnquist Court had in 2004. Although this unity broke down in the Court’s 
more important cases, Chief Justice Roberts himself contributed to the relative harmony by writing 
notably fewer concurring or dissenting opinions than the other justices.  Moreover, Chief Justice 
Roberts apparent reluctance to write concurring or dissenting opinions, and the relatively high rates of 
alignment between himself and the Court’s more liberal justices resulting from that reluctance, may 
indicate a willingness of the new Chief Justice to at least sign on to the type of narrow, minimalist 
opinions that can garner broader support on the Court.  Finally, the extremely high alignment rate of the 
Court’s two newest justices shows that these justices may have more in common with each other than 
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with the other conservatives on the Court, an intriguing possibility that warrants ongoing attention as 
these Justices continue to serve together in coming years. 
 
Appendix
Citation vote dir value Stevens Scalia Ken Souter Thomas Ginsbur Breyer Roberts Alito OC
126 S.Ct. 1675 54 liberal judicial pw dissent dissent majority majority dissent majority dissent majority majority .
126 S.Ct. 1689 90 liberal federalism majority majority majority majority majority majority majority majority majority .
126 S.Ct. 1752 90 liberal econ activity majority majority majority majority majority majority majority majority majority .
126 S.Ct. 1735 90 liberal judicial pw concur majority majority majority majority majority majority majority majority .
126 S.Ct. 1727 90 liberal crim pro majority majority majority majority majority majority majority majority majority .
126 S.Ct. 1854 90 con judicial pw majority majority majority majority majority concur majority majority majority .
126 S.Ct. 1869 90 con econ activity majority majority majority majority majority majority majority majority majority .
126 S.Ct. 1843 90 liberal econ activity majority majority majority majority majority majority majority majority majority .
126 S.Ct. 1837 90 n/a econ activity concur concur concur concur majority concur concur concur majority .
126 S.Ct. 1943 90 con crim pro concur majority majority majority majority majority majority majority majority .
126 S.Ct. 2378 63 con judicial pw dissent majority majority dissent majority dissent concur majority majority .
126 S.Ct. 2405 90 liberal civil rights majority majority majority majority majority majority majority majority concur .
126 S.Ct. 2422 81 con civil rights dissent majority majority majority majority majority majority majority majority .
126 S.Ct. 2437 72 con crim pro majority concur concur dissent majority majority dissent majority concur .
126 S.Ct. 2188 63 liberal crim pro majority dissent dissent majority dissent majority majority majority majority .
126 S.Ct. 2193 63 con crim pro majority majority majority dissent majority majority dissent majority majority .
126 S.Ct. 2266 81 con crim pro majority majority majority majority dissent majority majority majority majority .
126 S.Ct. 2208 54 con econ activity dissent majority concur dissent majority dissent dissent concur majority .
126 S.Ct. 2121 54 con judicial pw majority majority dissent dissent majority majority dissent majority dissent .
126 S.Ct. 2557 54 liberal crim pro majority majority dissent majority dissent majority majority dissent dissent .
126 S.Ct. 2516 54 con crim pro dissent concur majority dissent majority dissent dissent majority majority .
126 S.Ct. 2145 90 con judicial pw majority concur majority majority majority majority majority majority majority .
126 S.Ct. 2159 54 con crim pro dissent majority concur dissent majority dissent dissent majority majority .
126 S.Ct. 2096 90 liberal crim pro majority majority majority majority majority majority majority majority majority .
126 S.Ct. 1976 90 liberal crim pro majority majority majority majority majority majority majority majority majority .
126 S.Ct. 1991 72 con econ activity majority concur majority majority dissent majority dissent majority majority .
126 S.Ct. 1951 54 con 1st Am dissent majority majority dissent majority dissent dissent majority majority .
126 S.Ct. 1515 54 liberal crim pro concur dissent majority majority dissent majority concur dissent . .
126 S.Ct. 1494 80 con crim pro concur majority concur majority concur majority majority majority . .
126 S.Ct. 1503 80 liberal econ activity majority majority majority majority majority majority majority majority . .
126 S.Ct. 1297 80 con 1st Am majority majority majority majority majority majority majority majority . .
126 S.Ct. 1281 80 liberal econ activity majority majority majority majority majority majority majority majority . .
126 S.Ct. 1264 80 liberal econ activity majority majority majority majority majority majority majority majority . .
126 S.Ct. 1276 80 con econ activity majority majority majority majority majority majority majority majority . .
126 S.Ct. 1226 80 con crim pro majority concur majority majority concur majority majority majority . .
126 S.Ct. 1235 80 liberal civil rights majority majority majority majority majority majority majority majority . .
126 S.Ct. 1252 71 liberal econ activity majority majority majority majority dissent majority majority majority . .
126 S.Ct. 1246 80 con civil rights majority majority majority majority majority majority majority majority . .
126 S.Ct. 1204 71 con econ activity majority majority majority majority dissent majority majority majority . .
126 S.Ct. 1211 80 liberal 1st Am majority majority majority majority majority majority majority majority . .
126 S.Ct. 980 72 con judicial pw dissent majority dissent majority majority majority majority majority . majority
126 S.Ct 990 54 liberal federalism majority concur concur majority concur majority majority concur . majority
126 S.Ct. 952 90 con judicial pw majority majority majority majority majority majority majority majority . majority
126 S.Ct. 969 90 con crim pro majority majority majority concur majority majority concur majority . majority
126 S.Ct. 961 90 con misc majority majority majority majority majority majority majority majority . majority
126 S.Ct. 941 80 n/a misc majority majority majority majority . majority majority majority . majority
126 S.Ct. 904 63 liberal privacy majority dissent majority majority dissent majority majority dissent . majority
126 S.Ct. 884 54 con crim pro dissent majority majority dissent majority dissent dissent majority . majority
126 S.Ct. 846 90 con crim pro concur majority majority majority majority majority majority majority . majority
126 S.Ct 860 72 con econ activity dissent majority majority majority dissent majority majority majority . majority
126 S.Ct. 877 90 liberal federalism concur majority majority majority majority concur majority majority . majority
126 S.Ct. 699 90 con econ activity majority concur majority majority majority majority majority majority . majority
126 S.Ct. 704 90 con attorneys majority majority majority majority majority majority majority majority . majority
126 S.Ct. 676 72 con civil rights majority majority dissent majority majority dissent majority majority . majority
126 S.Ct. 606 90 liberal judicial pw majority majority majority majority majority majority majority majority . majority
126 S.Ct. 528 62 con civil rights concur majority majority majority majority dissent dissent . . majority
126 S.Ct. 510 90 liberal econ activity majority majority majority majority majority majority majority majority . majority
126 S.Ct. 514 90 liberal econ activity majority majority majority majority majority majority majority majority . majority
126 S.Ct. 1695 62 con 1st Am majority majority majority majority majority dissent dissent . . .
126 S.Ct. 2064 80 liberal crim pro majority concur majority majority concur majority majority concur . .
126 S.Ct. 1708 53 liberal due process majority dissent dissent majority dissent majority majority majority . .
126 S.Ct. 2572 62 con 1st Am dissent concur majority majority concur dissent majority majority . .
126 S.Ct. 2594 54 n/a civil rights split split majority split split split split split split .
126 S.Ct. 2669 63 con crim pro majority majority majority dissent majority concur dissent majority majority .
126 S.Ct. 2455 63 con civil rights dissent majority majority dissent majority concur dissent majority majority .
126 S.Ct. 2479 63 con 1st Am dissent concur majority dissent concur dissent majority majority concur .
126 S.Ct. 2546 72 con crim pro dissent majority concur majority majority dissent majority majority majority .
126 S.Ct. 2709 63 con due process dissent majority majority majority majority dissent concur majority majority .
126 S.Ct. 2749 53 liberal civil rights majority dissent concur concur dissent concur concur dissent dissent .
69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 68 69 69 67 34 18
